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Abstract
The paper offers a framework and a speciﬁc proposal for the re-regulation of key components
of the U.S. ﬁnancial system in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. It begins with a
review of those aspects of the subprime crisis that required the large, observed government inter-
ventions, namely the feared bankruptcy of individual banks, insurers, and government sponsored
enterprises with the potential to create a meltdown of the entire ﬁnancial system. The paper then
develops legislative responses that would make future systemic failures and bailouts of this magni-
tude highly unlikely. The paper’s key analytic device is to distinguish two ﬁnancial ﬁrm activities:
(1) risky investment activities (“hedge fund” division) capable of causing ﬁrm bankruptcy, and (2)
market-making and related activities (“infrastructure” division), the failure of which would have
systemic implications. The goal of the proposed regulatory change is to ensure that the infrastruc-
ture division is bankruptcy remote and can operate on a stand-alone basis if necessary even when
losses from the hedge fund division threaten the holding company’s solvency. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper offers a framework and a specific proposal for the re-regulation of the 
US investment banks and the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs, that is, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
The largest investment banks are now all operating within bank holding company 
structures, but the regulatory issues remain; indeed, the bank holding company 
structure makes it more important than ever to deal with the regulatory issues of 
the investment banks.
1 It may seem optimistic to refer to the subprime crisis in the 
past tense, but I believe this will soon be true, and that Congress and the new 
Administration will give their highest priority to the re-regulation of the US 
financial system. US financial history is replete with examples of a dialectic in 
which financial sector innovations create financial crises and financial crises 
create new regulatory structures. In both directions, I find an admirable record of 
success. 
First, financial system regulation has invariably responded to crises 
created by new financial market innovations, and almost always with long-lasting 
benefits. The following are examples of the impressive track record of regulatory 
responses to past financial crises: 
•  The National Bank Act of 1863 created federal chartering and regulation of 
commercial banks to control “wildcat banking.” This legislation also created 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
•  The Federal Reserve System was created in 1913 in response to a continuing 
sequence of financial panics. 
•  Federal deposit insurance was created in 1933 to stem the bank runs of the 
Great Depression. 
•  The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 to control the apparent conflicts of 
interest between commercial banks and investment banks during the 1930s. 
Glass-Steagall was later relaxed by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
and the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. 
•  The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created in 1934, establishing 
the government’s first insurance program for residential mortgages. Fannie 
Mae was created soon after, in 1938, to provide further support to the 
mortgage markets of the 1930s. In 1968, Fannie Mae was separated into two 
components: GNMA that continued as a government agency operating within 
                                                 
1 I also include AIG in the discussion, treating it as an investment bank, albeit one with a very 
large insurance subsidiary. On the other hand, the paper does not cover the regulation of 
commercial banks. The commercial banks are currently receiving very large capital infusions from 
the US Treasury, and it is premature to judge the very important implications for the redesign of 
commercial bank regulation. 
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HUD, and a new government sponsored enterprise that retained the name 
Fannie Mae. 
•  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDCIA), passed in response to the S&L crisis, required, among many other 
important provisions, that bank regulators take “prompt corrective action” 
with regard to any banking firm that was failing to meet capital or other 
regulatory requirements. 
In the other direction, capital market firms and entities have been 
successful in creating a long string of financial innovations, working either within 
or around the existing system of financial regulation.
2 The current subprime crisis 
provides cases in point. As one example, the design and implementation of 
subprime mortgages was carried out notwithstanding a substantial array of 
existing mortgage market and consumer protection legislation. As a second 
example, the major investment banks assembled highly risky, leveraged, and 
maturity mismatched portfolios notwithstanding their regulation by the SEC at a 
level that was nominally the equivalent of the highest standard applied by the 
Federal Reserve in regulating bank holding companies.
3 
The bottom line is that the sequence, financial innovation Æ crisis Æ 
regulatory response, has been a continuing theme of US financial history, with an 
admirable record of success in encouraging innovation while maintaining a 
generally safe and sound financial system.
4 Two particular features of the 
regulatory responses to the major crises should be noted: 
1)  The regulations have been highly focused in responding to the key issues of 
the time. 
2)  The regulations have generally been innovative, long-standing, and flexible. 
In this spirit, the current paper develops a framework and offers a proposal 
for the re-regulation of key components of the US financial system in the 
aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. I begin in Part 2 with a review of those 
aspects of the subprime crisis that require a regulatory response. My conclusion is 
that the unique aspect of the current crisis is that losses on a relatively small asset 
class—subprime mortgages—became sufficiently magnified to force the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury to bailout out the largest US financial firms, bailouts 
                                                 
2 Allen and Gale (1994) provide a systematic treatment of the process of financial innovation. 
White (2000) specifically discusses the connection between financial regulation and innovation. 
Silber (1975) provides a more institutional approach, including a chapter on mortgage market 
innovations by Jaffee (1975).  
3 See the testimony of SEC chairman Christopher Cox (2008). 
4 For a contrary view, see Wallison (2008a). 
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that are unprecedented in US financial history.
5 The bailouts occurred because the 
Federal Reserve and Treasury feared that the bankruptcy of individual banks, 
insurers, and government sponsored enterprises would create a meltdown of the 
entire financial system. An appropriate legislative response should thus focus on 
re-regulating the US financial system in order to make future systemic failures 
and bailouts of this magnitude highly unlikely. 
Part 3 of the paper then provides a specific proposal for the regulatory 
response. The starting point is to distinguish two financial firm activities: (1) risky 
investment activities that can threaten firm bankruptcy—what I call the “hedge 
fund division,” and (2) market making and related activities, the failure of which 
would have systemic implications—what I call the “infrastructure division”. As I 
define it here, the hedge fund division maintains a portfolio of risky investments, 
with the risk often further magnified through extensive leverage created by 
issuing short-term debt. Similarly, by definition, the infrastructure division carries 
out market making, payment, or insurance activities on which other traders and 
the market as a whole are critically dependent.
6 The core idea is to ensure that the 
infrastructure division is bankruptcy remote—can operate on a stand-alone basis 
if necessary—even when losses from the hedge fund division threaten the holding 
company’s solvency. Historical parallels can be found in the long-standing 
monoline regulations of catastrophe insurance firms and in the Glass-Steagall 
legislation including the 1956 and 1999 modifications. Part 4 provides concluding 
comments.  
2.  SOURCES OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE REGULATORY 
BAILOUTS 
What caused the subprime crisis, and what caused the regulatory bailouts? 
Answers to these questions are an essential starting point for the systematic 
development of any proposal to re-regulate the financial system in the aftermath 
of the subprime crisis. I take up the two questions in turn. 
                                                 
5 I use the term “bailout” to refer to the full range of loan and investment activities undertaken by 
the Federal Reserve and Treasury Agency in responding to the subprime crisis. “Bailout” seems 
the proper term since private sector financial firms were unwilling to take comparable actions in 
support of their failing brethren, presumably because the risk/return ratios were not favorable. 
6 As an example, making a market in credit default swaps (CDS) while maintaining a zero net 
position would be considered an infrastructure activity. On the other hand, if the firm were to 
maintain large none-zero positions, that is, to speculate on the outcome, that speculation would be 
considered part of the hedge fund division. 
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2.1.  What Caused the Subprime Crisis? 
The superficially simple question of what caused the subprime crisis has elicited a 
remarkably wide range of answers even among informed commentators. I begin 
with my list of the key culprits, then turn to additional factors proposed by the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. 
Subprime Mortgage Losses and a Boom and Bust Real Estate Cycle 
Defaulting subprime mortgages are, of course, an essential element in the crisis. 
The mortgages suffered from poor design and even more so from poor 
underwriting and origination. Predatory lending represented a particularly seamy 
aspect of the process. Finally, mortgage market institutions were poorly prepared 
to modify loans in lieu of foreclosure.  
The good news, so to speak, is that regulatory remedies to stop predatory 
lending and encourage loan modifications are already well in process. For 
predatory lending, the Federal Reserve has already issued important additions to 
the Truth in Lending Laws, and HUD will soon announce parallel changes in the 
RESPA rules; see Federal Reserve System (2008) and HUD (2008a). For loan 
modifications, Congress has created and HUD has now implemented the Hope for 
Homeowners program; see HUD (2008b), and a variety of additional both public 
and private plans have also been created.
7  
However poor the design and implementation of subprime mortgages, the 
crisis ensued only in the presence of a severe decline in US housing prices. This 
decline followed a common scenario for a real estate cycle:
8 
•  A financial innovation provided a major impetus to expand mortgage lending; 
•  Increased lending raised housing demand, which in turn raised house prices; 
•  Rising house prices encouraged still more lending, thus creating a self-
fulfilling and continuing circle of rising lending and rising house prices; 
•  Eventually, an affordability crisis and market crash occurred, as the market 
prices for housing became inconsistent with the economic fundamentals of 
homeowner affordability. 
Real estate cycles in this form are repeated with remarkable historical 
regularity, so it is an intriguing question why sophisticated financial investors 
continued to hold mortgage assets even as the real estate market prices became 
                                                 
7 To be clear, loan modification programs are likely to have limited success in deterring mortgage 
foreclosures. The Congressional Budget Office analysis of the Hope for Homeowners program, 
CBO (2008), is very instructive in showing that even with a significant subsidy, the program is 
expected to help only a small fraction of defaulting subprime loans. 
8 See Jaffee (1994) for a more extended discussion of real estate cycles, including an analysis of 
the Swedish real estate collapse and recovery of the early 1990s. 
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increasingly divorced from the affordability fundamentals. There is also the 
related question of whether the monetary authority should have taken greater 
action to dampen the up-leg of the cycle, particularly after its fears of 
macroeconomic deflation dissipated after 2004.  
In my view, a good part of the answer is that the impressive US post-war 
record of no aggregate decline in residential house prices caused the market 
participants to lose sight of the economic reality that significant house price 
declines could and would occur at some point.
9 Even now, we have observed only 
one national house price crash in 85 years, making this a low-probability, if very 
high consequence, event. It appears that even very smart people may err in 
treating low-probability events as if they will not occur at all (see, for example, 
Kunreuther, Novemsky, and Kahneman, 2001). 
It is also critical to recognize that while subprime loan losses are clearly a 
necessary element in a crisis of the same name, they are by no means sufficient to 
have required bailouts of the largest US financial firms. After all, subprime loans 
appear to represent no more than 4 percent of all US investment securities, and 
the aggregate loss rate on subprime loans in the end may not exceed 25 percent.
10 
Using these numbers, a representative US investment portfolio would suffer a 
one-time loss of 1.0 percent (= 0.04 x 0.25) as a result of its subprime investment. 
This is certainly not a number that would be expected to bring the largest US 
financial firms to their knees.  
Concentrated and Cashflow Mismatched Investment Portfolios 
The portfolio strategy followed by the primary investors in subprime mortgages 
and their derivatives is the key factor that transformed losses on a relatively minor 
asset class into the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. The 
investment strategy had two key elements: 
1)  The portfolios were highly concentrated in subprime mortgages, achieved by 
overweighting the asset class and by taking on the riskier tranches in subprime 
securitizations. 
                                                 
9 To be sure, individual house prices often fall, and there have been a number of important 
regional house price crashes. But these are basically idiosyncratic events that can be ignored by a 
large investor holding a geographically diversified mortgage portfolio. 
10 These are the author’s estimates, since there are no official or dependable numbers for subprime 
loans outstanding or losses realized. My estimate that subprime loans outstanding equal 4 percent 
of all US investment securities is computed as $2 trillion subprime loans outstanding relative to 
$50 trillion in total US nonfinancial debt and stock equity as of September 30, 2008 (from the 
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data). The 25 percent aggregate loss rate is computed as the 
product of a 50 percent default rate and a 50 percent rate for the loss given default. These numbers 
also imply expected total subprime losses of $500 billion (=25% of $2 trillion), which appears to 
be in line with other estimates. 
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2)  The portfolios were funded with short-term debt. Although this required 
frequent rollovers, no problems were anticipated since the underlying assets 
could serve as collateral. The implied interest rate risk was either accepted—
the so-called carry trade—or was synthetically hedged with interest rate 
derivates. 
As long as the mortgage losses remained moderate and the funding rollovers went 
smoothly, this investment strategy was immensely profitable based on leverage, 
maturity mismatch, and the high coupons available on the underlying mortgages.  
When house price declines began, however, the negative consequences for 
the investing firms were far greater than they anticipated. The confounding factor 
was that portfolio losses were transformed into an unmanageable liquidity crisis. 
That is, the investment firms were unable to roll over their maturing debt because 
the potential lenders were unsure of the value of the subprime collateral being 
offered to secure the loans. The valuation of securitization tranches of risky 
mortgages is very difficult because the quantitative methodologies are technically 
complex and highly dependent on the assumed future loss ratios. Also for this 
reason, immense bid-ask spreads developed in the trading markets for these 
securities, thus reinforcing the lenders’ concerns about the collateral value. In 
these circumstances, not to lend at all was a common and sensible conclusion. 
Securitization and the Credit Rating Agencies
11  
Securitization and the credit rating agencies are now commonly included as two 
additional factors that might have contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. For 
example, the recent report of The President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets (2008, p.1) included in its list of principal underlying causes of the crisis 
•  a significant erosion of market discipline by those involved in the 
securitization process, 
•  and flaws in credit rating agencies’ assessments of subprime mortgage 
residential mortgages. 
There is no doubt, of course, that most subprime mortgages were securitized and 
that the rating agencies seriously overrated these securities. There may also be 
little harm in the President’s Working Group’s recommendation for increased 
disclosure of securitization risks and rating agency methodologies.
12 However, I 
feel it is misleading to suggest that the re-regulation of securitization and the 
                                                 
11 A more a complete discussion of the issues in this section can be found in Jaffee (2008a). 
12 It should also be noted that the prospectuses for subprime securitizations would have fully 
described the risks, so no serious investor would have been mislead into believing that the 
securitization was based on anything other than risky mortgages. The rating agencies have also 
always disclosed the methodologies they use.  
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rating agencies is in any way a substitute for the re-regulation of the financial 
institutions that invested in subprime mortgages. In addition, securitization will 
continue to provide major benefits in linking local loan demands with capital 
market funding and in allocating the riskier components of these loan pools to the 
most knowledgeable and willing investors.  
But let us look at the charges. First, with respect to securitization, the 
common charge is that it contributed to the origination of poor quality loans since 
each party in the securitization chain could ignore the risk knowing that it would 
not be the final holder. But, of course, there must be a final holder, and as it 
happened with subprime securitization, these holders were the largest and most 
sophisticated institutional investors in the world. It thus seems implausible that 
these investors were systematically either duped or negligent in evaluating the 
subprime risks just because they were securitized.
13 The fault is thus not in the 
securitization process, but in the investment decisions and the regulations that 
allowed investors with systemic responsibilities to take on highly risky positions,  
Second, with respect to the rating agencies, while it has become a popular 
Congressional game to roast these firms for their serious errors in rating subprime 
mortgages, the agencies’ track records in rating a wide range of securitization 
classes—auto loans, credit card loans, etc.—over a long time period indicates a 
predominance of upgrades, not downgrades. This suggests that the general bias, if 
any, has been toward a pessimism in ratings, albeit with the subprime experience 
the major exception. It is thus just as plausible to suggest the agencies’ moral 
hazard has been to offer conservative ratings in order to protect their reputation as 
it is to suggest that the agencies overrated subprime mortgages to garner the fees. 
My conclusion is that the re-regulation of securitization and the ratings 
agencies is a diversion, and that the key regulatory thrust must be related to the 
bankruptcy and threatened bankruptcy of the largest US financial firms. We now 
turn to the issue of why the Treasury and Federal Reserve felt it necessary to bail 
out these firms. 
2.2.  Why Did the Treasury and Federal Reserve Provide 
Bailouts
14 
A bankruptcy process starts immediately when a financial firm is unable to roll 
over its maturing debt. This is true even if the firm is solvent, meaning that its 
                                                 
13 If the term “subprime” was not considered a sufficient disclosure of high risk, data provided by 
the Mortgage Bankers indicated as early as 2002 that extremely high rates of delinquency and 
default occurred on subprime mortgages as a result of the dot-com bust. Indeed, FICO scores on 
securitized subprime loans were raised significantly and steadily after 2002 as a result of concerns 
raised by these disclosures. For further discussion, see Jaffee (2008a). 
14 Material in this section is based in part on Jaffee and Perlow (2008). 
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asset values exceed its liabilities. It appears that this would have been the exact 
fate of Bear Stearns, American International Group (AIG), and the GSEs in the 
absence of their government bailouts. Indeed, it was the fate of Lehman Brothers 
for whom no bailout was provided. This raises the question of why the firms 
were, in fact, bailed out. 
Based on official statements, both Bear Stearns and AIG were rescued 
because they were too interconnected to fail.
15 The reference here is to the central 
role both firms played as market makers and counterparties in the worldwide 
market for derivatives. These derivatives included the more mundane interest rate 
and foreign exchange swaps and the more exotic and riskier credit default swaps. 
These derivatives are mainly traded over-the-counter, with the investment banks 
and AIG, among others, serving as market makers and counterparties, 
individually tailoring each transaction in terms of principal amounts, maturity, 
payoff events, and other technical features (such as the strike price when the 
contract is an option). As a result of this large and sophisticated market, financial 
firms (including banks and hedge funds) have created a complex network of 
interlinking derivative positions—for example, hedge fund A enters into a swap 
with hedge fund B because it knows B has hedged certain risks with investment 
bank C. This network creates systemic risk as an externality, since if one key 
counterparty were to fail on its derivative obligations, the failure would likely 
create a cascade of failures larger than any single counterparty has the incentive to 
try to prevent. 
The bailout of the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) is somewhat more 
complicated than Bear Stearns and AIG. To be sure, the GSEs are perhaps the 
world’s largest counterparties in the markets for interest rate swaps and swaptions 
(options based on swaps), and their failure on these contracts could well have had 
systemic effects as large as Bear Stearns or AIG. Indeed, Secretary of the 
Treasury Paulson in explaining their bailout stated:  
…[this] program is the best means of protecting our markets and the 
taxpayers from the systemic risk posed by the current financial 
condition of the GSEs (Paulson, 2008).  
He was also referring, however, to the disruptive effects if the firms had defaulted 
on their approximately $5 trillion of capital market obligations—debt and 
guaranteed-mortgage-backed securities. There was also serious concern that the 
GSEs could not continue their mission to support the US mortgage market if 
doubts remained concerning their ability to roll over their debt or to meet their 
regulatory capital requirements. Technically, the GSEs were placed in a 
conservatorship, under the control of their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance 
                                                 
15 On Bear Stearns, see Cox (2008, p. 1); on AIG see President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets (2008, p. 4). 
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Agency (FHFA). Under this status, the GSEs no longer must meet capital 
requirements, and if necessary, they have access to the Treasury to borrow, sell 
mortgages, and obtain capital infusions. 
3. THE FUTURE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT BANKS AND THE 
GSES 
Bear Stearns, AIG, and the GSEs were bailed out because the losses they incurred 
on their investment portfolios created the high likelihood of an imminent 
bankruptcy, which in turn posed a systemic risk to the full financial system. In all 
three cases, the systemic risk included the firms’ role as major counterparties in 
the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. In the case of the GSEs, 
additional systemic risks were created by the firms’ $5 trillion of debt and MBS 
obligations and their critical role in stabilizing the mortgage markets. In this 
section, I develop a framework and proposal for re-regulating the investment 
banks and the GSEs in a post-crisis environment. I begin with a description of the 
problem at hand. 
3.1.  The Dilemma for Effective Regulation 
The basic regulatory dilemma posed by the investment banks and the GSEs is that 
they have carried out two parallel, but very different, business activities. On the 
one hand, they operate what are basically hedge funds, that is, highly leveraged 
and cashflow mismatched portfolios. I will refer to this as their “hedge fund 
division.” On the other hand, they carry out systemic missions, serving as key 
counter parties in the OTC derivatives market, and in the case of the GSEs, with 
the additional mission to stabilize the mortgage markets. I will refer to this as 
their “infrastructure division.” Both divisions provide fundamental economic 
benefits.  
The hedge fund divisions are major participants in the fundamental market 
activity of aggregating information. While the funds are operated for private 
profit, they generate the social benefits of price discovery and efficient resource 
allocations. Both the private profits and social benefits will generally be 
maximized if the funds are managed with the least regulatory intrusion.
16 The 
problem arises, however, if the hedge fund is part of a larger holding company, 
and one where another division carries out an infrastructure function that would 
require the firm to be bailed out if losses from the hedge fund threatened 
bankruptcy for the overall entity. 
                                                 
16 See Wallison (2008) for a strong statement in support of the nonregulation of hedge funds. 
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With the problem posed in this manner, the general structure for a solution 
becomes clear: to separate the two activities in a manner that makes the 
infrastructure division fully bankruptcy remote from any losses of the hedge fund 
division. The long experience in both insurance and banking regulation with 
monoline methods offers a mechanism for such solutions. There are other possible 
solutions, mainly to regulate the hedge fund division to such a high standard that 
the risk of failure is basically eliminated. However, in my opinion these solutions 
will also eliminate the key social benefits of hedge funds. I now briefly review the 
monoline technique. 
3.2.  The Monoline Insurer Solution 
Insurance regulation in the US has long dealt with the dilemma that insurance 
lines have widely varying risk characteristics. At one extreme, the catastrophe 
lines, with very fat tailed risk distributions, unavoidably create the potential for 
insurer default. That is, there is no feasible level of capital that a catastrophe risk 
insurer could hold that would allow it to pay all possible claims.
17 If the insurer 
defaults, policyholders with claims receive prorated payments. This risk of 
nonperformance, of course, reduces the insurance premiums paid by 
policyholders. At the other extreme, the law of large numbers basically applies to 
many insurance lines—such as auto insurance—with the result that the need for 
capital is limited and there is very little risk of insurer default. I will call these 
“standard lines.” 
As a further complication, most insurers operate within multiline 
insurance holding companies, raising the possibility that a holding company could 
own subsidiaries covering both catastrophe lines and standard lines. This creates 
the possibility that losses on the catastrophe line could bankrupt the holding 
company, creating losses for policyholders with claims on the standard line. This 
issue came to the fore in 1956 when a firm (Mortgage Guaranty Insurance 
Company, MGIC) petitioned to offer private mortgage insurance (PMI)—that is, 
insurance to be sold to lenders as protection against the risk of default by 
mortgage borrowers. It was well understood that PMI is a catastrophe line, since 
an earlier vintage of private mortgage insurers had failed early in the Great 
Depression. The regulatory response was to allow the firm to be chartered, but 
only as a monoline insurer—it could offer only private mortgage insurance. The 
effect was to ensure that policyholders on standard lines would not be subject to 
                                                 
17 This assumes that there is an excess cost of holding capital within an insurance firm. This seems 
to be true, since all insurers significantly limit the amount of capital they hold. For a further 
discussion and a model of insurer default see Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2008a). 
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the default risk that would be created if a multiline holding company also began to 
offer PMI coverage.
18 
Starting in the early 1980s, other insurers petitioned for authority to offer 
bond insurance, which like mortgage insurance, has a fat distribution of losses. 
This initial request covered municipal bonds, but it later expanded to corporate 
bonds, and most recently even to securitizations. The regulatory response was 
also to charter these firms as monoline insurers.
19 
Overall, the regulatory structure for monoline insurance has worked very 
well. By construction, of course, there have been no events in which the failure of 
a monoline catastrophe insurer created any losses for policyholders on standard 
lines. Equally interesting, even with the losses arising from the current subprime 
crisis, there have been no failures—yet—among either the private mortgage or the 
bond insurers.
20 This reflects well on the substantial capital held by these firms, in 
part due to regulatory requirements and in part reflecting the market discipline 
imposed on these firms by their bond holders and policyholders. 
3.3.  The Glass-Steagall Solution 
Commercial banking legislation equally well has a long tradition of applying a 
monoline structure to control the undesired spillover of risks. The original 1933 
Glass-Steagall Act was a pure monoline restriction: it allowed a commercial bank 
to carry out a “banking business”—generally defined as taking deposits and 
making loans—and nothing else. The Act clearly separated commercial banks 
from investment banks, but it actually separated commercial banks from any other 
business line. 
It became apparent that this extreme monoline restriction also created 
costs; even business activities that could be efficiently carried out by commercial 
banks were prohibited. The 1956 Bank Holding Act thus modified the original 
Glass-Steagall Act, regulating bank holding companies which could own one or 
more commercial banks, and could carry out, at the holding company level, 
                                                 
18 See Jaffee (2006) for an industrial organization study of the private mortgage insurance industry 
and its monoline requirements. 
19 Unfortunately, in the last several years, the insurance regulators have allowed these firms to 
offer insurance on highly risky collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps 
(CDS), and even to share capital with the municipal bond insurance line. This violates the basic 
monoline principle, which would require separating the capital of the two divisions. As it has 
happened, the insurers are now facing severe losses on their CDO and CDS lines, which threatens 
their ability to  pay future claims on the municipal bond line. 
20 The severe financial distress at AIG is entirely due to its losses in providing coverage on CDO 
and CDS contracts.  These products were sold from a London office that had no link with US 
insurance regulation. Indeed, there are no known problems with the traditional insurance lines sold 
by AIG’s US regulated insurance divisions. 
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activities that were “closely related to banking”. The Federal Reserve was given 
the regulatory authority to determine what activities met this requirement. The 
Fed was also responsible to ensure that the safety and soundness of commercial 
bank subsidiaries was the first priority in bank holding company management. For 
example, the Fed would scrutinize any requests to upstream capital from a 
subsidiary commercial bank to the holding company, to confirm that the safety 
and soundness of the commercial bank was properly protected. Over the years, the 
Fed expanded the list of activities that were allowed as “closely related to 
banking”, but it never authorized a bank holding company to carry out either an 
investment banking or insurance business. 
The most recent evolutionary stage of Glass Steagall was the Financial 
Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999. This Act created a “financial 
holding company” as a special status for a bank holding company, with the power 
to operate both investment banking and insurance subsidiaries, along with its 
commercial bank subsidiaries. The Fed again has the regulatory power. It is under 
this authority that bank holding companies such as Citigroup and Bank of 
America operate both investment banks and commercial banks. It is also under 
this authority that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley recently became bank 
holding companies. 
While the MSFA is often described as repealing Glass-Steagall, that is not 
true. Most importantly, the Federal Reserve continues to impose special standards 
on the bank holding companies that own investment banks. For one thing, these 
bank holding companies must meet the Fed’s highest capital standards (referred to 
as “well capitalized”). For a second thing, the Fed continues to require the holding 
company to give the highest priority to the safety and soundness of its commercial 
bank subsidiaries. For example, the Fed will still apply a safety and soundness test 
to any request to transfer capital from a commercial bank subsidiary to the 
investment bank subsidiary. 
3.4.  A Proposal for the Effective Regulation of Investment Banks 
Even with the largest investment banks now all operating as subsidiaries within 
bank holding companies, the risk remains that losses from the hedge fund division 
of the investment bank subsidiary could endanger the entire bank holding 
company. And if that holding company also carries out infrastructure activities, 
such as operating as a counterparty in derivative markets or as a core participant 
in the country’s payment system, then there is the risk that the government will 
again resort to bailouts in order to avoid a systematic failure.
21 
                                                 
21 It could be argued, as well, that the risk of losses from the investment banking subsidiary would 
also threaten the commercial banking subsidiary. However, as noted in the text, the Fed should be 
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My proposal is to impose a monoline requirement on any investment bank 
that wishes to carry out both hedge fund and infrastructure activities, whether it 
operates independently or as part of a bank holding company. The goal is clear: 
losses created by the hedge fund division must not be allowed to threaten the 
performance of any infrastructure divisions. A particularly simple and clean 
version of the proposal would require that infrastructure divisions be structured as 
separate subsidiaries and with dedicated capital, thus providing the same 
protection to these subsidiaries that is currently provided to commercial bank 
subsidiaries within bank holding companies. A further benefit of this structure is 
that the regulator could readily impose comparable monoline restrictions on any 
future activities that might be deemed to have systemic importance. 
This proposal is not cost free. For one thing, there may be administrative 
costs associated with isolating the infrastructure divisions with separate 
subsidiaries, although for very large bank holding companies these costs should 
be minor. A more significant cost arises from the restriction that the capital of the 
protected infrastructure subsidiary cannot be applied to cover losses arising from 
the activities of any other subsidiaries of the bank holding company. That is, the 
normal diversification benefit of applying capital across the divisions of a 
multiline or conglomerate entity are intentionally truncated here in the interest of 
the safety and soundness of the protected subsidiary. The proposal, however, still 
creates a Pareto Optimal outcome, in the sense that any alternative solution would 
necessarily make at least one class of agents—the taxpayers in particular—worse 
off.
22 
The proposal made here is not meant to preclude additional regulatory 
refinements and changes. As one example, it could well be that decisions will be 
made to raise the risk-based capital requirements imposed on banks as a further 
means to improve their future safety. However, it is worth remembering that Bear 
Stearns and AIG required bailouts even though they satisfied their capital 
requirements. That is, the proximate source of their failure was their inability to 
rollover maturing debt, although this liquidity crisis was no doubt magnified by 
concern over the firms’ solvency. A monoline restriction remains the only 
regulatory response that can with high certainty rule out future episodes requiring 
bailouts. 
                                                                                                                                     
ensuring that the commercial bank subsidiaries are bankruptcy remote from the holding company. 
Bank customers, of course, may not make sharp distinctions between bank holding companies 
(Citigroup as an example) and commercial banks (Citibank as an example), and thus a bank run 
might start just on the news that the holding company is in financial distress. This would require 
standard use of the Fed’s discount window, but this should not impose any costs on the 
government and therefore would not be considered a bailout. 
22 This statement is based on the optimality conditions of monoline restrictions as recently 
developed in Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2008b). 
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A second additional regulatory response would be to eliminate the 
systemic risk that necessitated the bailouts. Indeed, there are already initiatives to 
improve the clearing facilities for derivatives and to introduce great use of 
exchange-traded instruments. While such initiatives are definitely constructive, 
the tailor-made character of the OTC derivatives may limit their usefulness. 
More generally, regulators must anticipate that financial institutions and 
markets will continue to innovate, creating new and risky instruments and 
therefore the potential for new crises. In this context, monoline restrictions have 
the important attribute that they can be rapidly applied to any innovation that 
threatens systemic risks, as long as the regulators can recognize the potential for 
systemic failure. 
3.5.  A Proposal for the Effective Regulation of the GSEs 
The government sponsored enterprises (GSEs, that is, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac) also carry out two distinct activities. The first is their retained mortgage 
portfolios through which the firms jointly hold approximately $1.5 trillion of 
mainly mortgage backed securities and which are funded by the issue of 
approximately the same amount of corporate debt.
23 The retained portfolios of 
both firms reflect a major cashflow mismatch in that the debt issued to fund the 
portfolio is of much shorter maturity than the MBS that are held. In addition, the 
firms made significant investments in subprime mortgage securities in the last two 
years. Finally, the portfolios are hugely leveraged—at about $40 to $1—since the 
legislated capital requirement is only 2.5 percent of assets. Thus in all three 
characteristics—leverage, cashflow mismatch, and subprime investments—the 
retained portfolios of the GSEs are remarkably similar to the hedge fund 
portfolios described earlier for the investment banks. And it appears that their 
bailout on September 7, 2008 was necessitated by the same issues of solvency and 
a liquidity crisis that necessitated the bailout of Bear Stearns and AGI. 
The second business line for the GSEs is a securitization business in which 
they obtain sets of qualifying mortgages and securitize them into what are called 
“Agency MBS.” The GSEs guarantee the timely payment of interest and principal 
on their MBS issues, for which the firms earn annual guarantee fees. The GSEs 
currently have outstanding approximately $3.5 trillion of such securitized 
mortgage pools. It appears that the GSEs placed a relatively small amount of 
                                                 
23 The capital requirement on the retained portfolios is legislatively set at 2.5% of assets, although 
even this requirement has been waived under the firms’ conservatorship. The debt used to fund the 
retained portfolios is commonly referred to as “agency bonds” reflecting investor expectations of 
an implicit government guarantee, a guarantee which has been made explicit under the firms’ 
conservatorship.  
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subprime mortgages into these Agency MBSs compared to their retained portfolio 
investments. A likely explanation is that the GSEs can profit from the much 
higher coupon rates offered on subprime mortgages only if they are the actual 
investor as in the retained portfolios. 
My proposal for the GSEs also follows a monoline structure by separating 
the hedge-fund-like retained portfolios from the Agency MBS division. The 
actual implementation would occur at the time the firms are released from their 
conservatorships. At that time, I propose maintaining the Agency MBS division 
as a government agency, while I would spin off the retained portfolio to the 
shareholders with the resulting entity functioning as a private sector investment 
company with no continuing links to the US government. The following provides 
more specifics as to how I expect the two entities to function. 
The MBS Division as a Government Agency 
A simple view of my proposal for the MBS division is to consider it as a new 
government agency providing mortgage market access for middle-income 
families much as the existing FHA and GNMA programs provide mortgage 
market support for lower-income families. I believe that the FHA/GNMA 
combination provides a useful model because it represents a long-standing, stable, 
and successful program for supporting the homeownership goals of lower-income 
families (see Green and Wachter, 2005). 
Since it began in 1934, the FHA has operated to insure the mortgages on 
homes for lower-income families, thus providing these families with access to 
mortgage funding that would not otherwise be available.
24 The insurance 
premiums are paid by the borrowers and must be set to cover the expected losses, 
with the exception of special programs on which subsidies are explicitly 
intended.
25 Over its long history, the primary FHA program has been self-
supporting and has required no government appropriations. GNMA was created in 
1968 as a government agency operating within HUD, with the primary task of 
securitizing the government guaranteed FHA and VA mortgages. Indeed, GNMA 
pioneered the concept of mortgage-backed securities in 1970. GNMA has 
continued to operate with a small staff to certify the pools of FHA and VA 
                                                 
24 The recent era of subprime mortgages is a noteworthy exception. To its credit, the FHA did not 
try to compete with the subprime mortgages, but instead allowed its volume to dwindle to close to 
zero. Indeed, there were discussions of the demise of the FHA. In the wake of the subprime crisis, 
in contrast, FHA volume has been soaring, and these numbers do not yet include the agency’s 
participation in the new Hope for Homeowners program that offers access to FHA loans for 
subprime borrowers facing imminent foreclosure. 
25 The new Hope for Homeowners program is an example of an FHA program with an explicit 
subsidy. See the Congressional Budget Office (2008) for a very useful analysis of how this 
subsidy is being computed. 
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mortgages created by private sector originators as mortgage-backed securities. 
GNMA provides a guarantee equivalent to the US Treasury on its MBS, but since 
the underlying mortgages are already government guaranteed, there is no risk.  
My proposal is to transform the current Agency MBS division of the GSEs 
into a government agency that would provide the same services of government 
insurance and securitization to middle-income families that the FHA/GNMA 
currently and successfully offers to lower-income families. I will refer to the new 
agency as “MIMA (middle-income mortgage agency).” Just as the FHA charges 
the borrowers an actuarially based insurance fee, so will MIMA, although with its 
more creditworthy clientele I expect the premium to be much lower. I expect 
MIMA to avail itself of the mortgage underwriting skills that have been 
developed within the GSEs and other private market mortgage entities. The GSEs 
have been charging MBS guarantee fees on the order of 20 bps annually, and I see 
no reason why that would change under MIMA. I would also expect private sector 
mortgage originators and mortgage investors to welcome the new government 
agency, for the same reason they enthusiastically use the FHA/GNMA agencies. 
In particular, private sector firms will continue to originate and hold the 
mortgages, so they would face no government crowding out. Similarly, the private 
market securitizers of “jumbo” mortgages—above the GSE limits for conforming 
mortgages—would continue to operate as they do currently. The only losers, so to 
speak, are the subprime originators, from whom we might not expect to hear very 
much at all. 
The Retained Mortgage Portfolios as Private Sector Hedge Funds 
The second part of the proposal is to spin off the retained mortgage portfolios to 
the GSE shareholders, and to transform these entities into what would become 
basically publicly traded mortgage REITs.
26 The GSE shareholders would receive 
the mortgage assets, bond liabilities, and the net worth of the retained portfolios 
as it exists at the time of the spinoff. These entities would also receive all of the 
intellectual capital of the GSEs, which would include their proprietary software 
for evaluating loan quality, techniques for hedging interest rate risk, and similar 
items. As private sector entities, the new firms would no longer be constrained by 
the limitations of the GSE charters. In particular, they would be allowed, for the 
first time, to originate mortgages directly. A similar path to privatization was 
taken earlier by Sallie Mae—the student loan government sponsored enterprise—
and it prospered for many years based on its new power to originate student loans. 
                                                 
26 This proposal presumes there would be no significant value to the government to continue to 
operate the retained portfolios. On the contrary, the GSEs have argued strongly that the retained 
portfolios were important for carrying their market mission. See also the discussion in Roll (2003). 
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The End of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as Government Sponsored 
Enterprises 
This solution ends Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as government sponsored 
enterprises, and well it should. Many commentators, including this author, have 
long argued that the concept of a privately owned, profit maximizing company 
combined with a public mission and an implicit government guarantee was a 
recipe for disaster (see, for example, Jaffee, 2003). The disaster has now occurred. 
The proposal offered here reassembles the components of these GSEs into an 
equitable and efficient structure. Given the continuing Congressional support for 
homeownership, it is appropriate to provide mortgage market access for middle-
income families, as the new agency will do. In my opinion, direct government 
guarantee of a core element of the mortgage market is also essential for capital 
investors to regain confidence in mortgage investments. It is possible that at some 
later date the government may withdraw from this activity, perhaps by charging 
higher guarantee fees until the demand shifts to private market mechanisms. At 
the same time, the GSE shareholders will own and manage the retained portfolios, 
albeit as private sector entities. 
Low-Income Housing Support 
One further issue concerns the support to lower-income borrowers that has been 
provided by the GSEs through their required housing goals and the recently 
passed profit fees. Congressional support of the GSEs was based in significant 
part on the premise that GSE aid to lower-income families was basically available 
at no cost; it certainly was perceived to be easier to “tax” the GSEs than to obtain 
Congressional appropriations to increase the HUD budget for direct housing 
subsidies. As their bailout costs have demonstrated, however, the GSE support for 
lower-income borrowers was actually far from free. Instead, Congress should now 
recognize that specific appropriations to the FHA represent a much more effective 
means to help low-income borrowers than any link to Fannie and Freddie could 
ever provide. 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has offered a framework and proposal for the re-regulation of 
investment banks and the GSEs in a post-crisis world. The basic goal is to 
minimize the likelihood that future losses on risky portfolios would pose systemic 
risks requiring government bailouts of the offending firms. The key feature of the 
proposed solution is to isolate the risky portfolios—called the “hedge fund 
divisions”—from the activities that create the systemic risk—called the 
“infrastructure divisions.” Comparable regulatory mechanisms have been in long 
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use in regulating catastrophe insurers in the form of monoline restrictions and in 
regulating bank holding companies through modified Glass-Steagall restrictions. 
Given that all major investment banks are now already part of bank holding 
companies, the only real change for the banks is to ensure that the capital of the 
infrastructure division is bankruptcy remote from any possible failure of the 
overall holding company. The proposal has more major ramifications for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac as GSEs, since it would transform their MBS securitization 
divisions into government agencies in parallel with the FHA and GNMA, while it 
would spin off their retained portfolios to the GSE shareholders, but with the 
requirement that the entity function without any appearance or reality of 
government support. 
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